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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Though  relatively  small,  the  subprime  mortgage-backed  securities
market  is  often  identified  as  the  source  of  the crisis  that  swept
through  the  U.S.  financial  system  from  2007  onwards.  We  investi-
gate  if  its  role in the  propagation  of  the  crisis  was  due  to contagion
or interdependence.  Using  a Markov-switching  VAR  with  time-
varying  transition  probabilities,  we  analyse  the  transmission  of
shocks  across  the  financial  system.  We  find  little  evidence  of  asset
correlation  changes  between  normal  and  crisis  regimes  and those
that  do  occur  are  predominantly  associated  with  liquidity  vari-
ables.  Otherwise,  relationships  are  stable  across  market  conditions,
implying  that  the  U.S.  financial  crisis  was  due  to cross-market
interdependencies  rather  than  contagion.  There  is  limited  evidence
that  the  deteriorating  quality  of  the  underlying  assets  can  explain
the  transition  from  ‘normal’  market  conditions  to a high-volatility
regime,  although  this  is not  consistent  across  model  specifications.
© 2015  Elsevier  Inc.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
In 2007, increasing uncertainty regarding asset valuations and subsequent losses in the market for
subprime mortgage-backed securities heralded the onset of a severe financial crisis. Its repercussions
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reverberated throughout the entire financial system, affecting stock markets, bond markets (both cor-
porate and sovereign), and short-term funding markets, firstly in the United States and later across
much of the international financial system. It is generally accepted that the market for these mortgage-
backed securities and other associated complex derivative instruments served as the source of the
initial shock that led to the widespread turmoil, see Gorton (2009), Brunnermeier (2008), Dungey,
Dwyer, and Flavin (2013), among others. This fledgling market had experienced rapid growth in the
five-year period preceding the crisis as investors chased high-yield investment opportunities. The
“tranche and ratings” feature of these products appealed to investors, particularly those with a man-
date to hold only AAA-rated securities. Initially suppliers of these asset-backed securities struggled to
meet the growing demand, leading to increasingly lax lending standards (Mian & Sufi, 2009) which
further fuelled market growth. The share of subprime mortgages increased from approximately 9%
of new mortgages in the early 2000s to over 40% in 2006 (Hellwig, 2009) and subprime mortgage-
backed security issuance almost doubled from $195 billion to $362.5 billion during the same period
(Park, 2010).
However, this market remained a relatively small sector of the overall financial system. Dwyer and
Tkac (2009) estimate that, as of December 2006, its value represented approximately 1% of the total
value of global bond markets, stock markets and bank deposits. Therefore a key question that emerges
is just how did a shock to this relatively small sector lead to such widespread financial market turmoil?
This question is the focus of our paper. In particular, we aim to determine if the spread of the crisis
across the financial system was due to financial market contagion or to other predictable factors. We
employ an econometric model which allows us to test for two different forms of contagion.1 Firstly, we
turn to a definition of contagion proposed by Masson (1999a, 1999b), whereby a shock to one market
can trigger a system-wide transition to a new, usually bad, equilibrium. We  investigate if the subprime
mortgage-backed market acted as the driving force behind the transition from tranquil conditions to
the recent crisis state. The second, and more often used, definition of contagion operates through
the correlation channel. This seeks to distinguish between contagion and market interdependencies.
Interdependencies are defined as market correlations that exist in all states of the world and arise due
to standard asset market linkages and exposure to common risk sources. Contagion, on the other hand,
is a channel that operates only during a crisis or following a large adverse shock. We  employ a definition
of contagion that is consistent with that of Forbes and Rigobon (2002); namely that contagion occurs
when market correlations intensify during a crisis period in excess of what might be expected given
the interdependencies that exist during “normal” market conditions. Forbes (2012) distills a number of
theoretical channels through which contagion may  arise. These include banks and lending institutions;
portfolio rebalancing following a shock; wake-up calls; and changes in investor risk aversion.2 Banks
and lending institutions that experience a negative shock may  respond by curtailing the supply of credit
to other sectors and/or the real economy. The fact that banks are often highly leveraged tends to amplify
the initial shock, as shown by Van Wincoop (2011) and Shin (2012). Investors may  undertake portfolio
rebalancing following a shock as they sell-off “good” assets to meet cash requirements or to satisfy
portfolio weight restrictions. Wake-up calls refer to the tendency of financial market participants to
reassess the riskiness of all asset classes following a shock to one asset. This may  lead to a period
of retrenchment with sales of assets whose perceived risk has grown. Related to this are changes to
investors’ risk tolerance. Following a shock to one asset, investors may  demand a higher risk premium
to hold other risky assets, thereby leading to further portfolio rebalancing.
In this paper, we test for contagion from the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities market to
other sectors of the U.S. financial system during the recent crisis. We  track the market for mortgage-
backed securities using the ABX.HE indexes (discussed in detail in the next section), which were
initially introduced with the aim of adding transparency to this predominantly over-the-counter (OTC)
market. The seminal work testing for contagion from the ABX indexes is due to Longstaff (2010) who
1 There is little consensus in the academic literature as to what exactly constitutes contagion. Claessens, Dornbusch, and
Park  (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2010), among others, provide useful
overviews of the different definitions used in the literature.
2 Forbes (2012) also includes the international trade channel but we concentrate on different sectors of the U.S. financial
system so this is not relevant here.
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focuses on the stability of relationships, i.e., the correlation-based approach. We  build on this study in
a number of important ways. Our first innovation is to employ a different, more suitable, econometric
methodology which provides a clearer picture of the shock transmission that characterised the finan-
cial system during the crisis period. We  argue that the standard vector autoregressive (VAR) approach
of Longstaff (2010), which exogenously imposes the crisis period, is not necessarily the best method to
measure contagion and we instead estimate a time-varying transition probability Markov-switching
VAR (TVTP MS-VAR) model, as developed by Filardo (1994).3 This has a number of advantages over
the standard VAR. In our specification of the model, we  allow both the mean parameters and the asset
variances to switch discretely between two regimes. Regimes are determined endogenously by the
data, giving a potentially cleaner delineation between the “crisis” and “non-crisis” periods. The regime
switch models the heteroskedasticity of asset returns and overcomes the problem of assuming a con-
stant covariance matrix of return innovations. We  examine the “correlation channel” of contagion by
analysing the stability of cross-market linkages between regimes. In particular, we test if our estimated
parameters change as we move from a low- to a high-volatility financial environment. Statistically
significant changes indicate instability in cross-market relationships and hence, financial market con-
tagion. If no such changes are detected, then we would conclude that market interdependencies served
to propagate the shock. Furthermore, we assess the role of the subprime mortgage-backed market in
explaining the transition of the financial system from one state to another. We  do this by allowing the
time-varying probabilities to depend on asset returns from this sector and test if they add explanatory
power over the evolution of the crisis and trigger the turmoil.
Our second contribution is to provide a more holistic picture of the evolving cross-market relation-
ships. Initially, and for comparability with Longstaff (2010), we  concentrate on testing for contagion
from the subprime mortgage-backed market to government, corporate, money, volatility and equity
markets. We  then proceed to assess the stability of all other cross-market linkages, thereby building a
more complete representation of the financial system during this tumultuous episode. This extension
provides some interesting insights into the sources of instability in the U.S. financial system over the
crisis period.
We  conduct our analysis using the longest available continuously traded ABX index. Although all
cross-market correlations intensify during the crisis regime, we find little evidence of contagion from
the subprime mortgage-backed asset market to other sectors of the financial system. In fact, most
evidence of contagious effects stem from liquidity variables and the VIX market. For robustness, we
repeat the analysis using a spliced index (as in Longstaff, 2010) to investigate if our results are sensitive
to the changing composition of this index. There is some evidence that it has explanatory power over
the determination of the regime path but it is not consistent across different specifications. Overall,
our findings suggest that cross-market interdependencies, and not contagion, were central to the
transmission of the initial subprime-mortgage market shock across the U.S. financial system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data, paying special
attention to the ABX.HE indexes that we employ to track the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed market.
Section 3 presents our econometric methodology. Section 4 outlines our model specification, reports
and discusses our results, and presents a number of robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 contains our
concluding remarks.
2. Data
2.1. The ABX.HE indexes
The exceptional growth of the subprime mortgage-backed securities sector during the early 2000s
led to the creation of the ABX.HE indexes, standardised indexes that initially provided credibility,
3 Variants of this type of model have previously been employed in the currency crisis literature by Peria (2002), Mandilaras
and  Bird (2010) and Brunetti, Scotti, Mariano, and Tan (2008), while Guo, Chen, and Huang (2011) apply a MS-VAR model to
test  for contagion between the market for credit default swaps (CDS), equity, real estate and energy markets.
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transparency and liquidity to this relatively new and innovative structured finance market.4 Produced
by the Markit Group, the first index was launched on January 19, 2006 (ABX 06-1). Subsequently new
indexes were introduced at six-monthly intervals, i.e., July 19, 2006 (ABX 06-2), January 19, 2007 (ABX
07-1) and July 19, 2007 (ABX 07-2) until the underlying asset market became so impaired that the fifth
issue was postponed indefinitely and is now unlikely to take place. The reason for rolling the indexes
in this fashion was to provide information on prevailing conditions in the subprime mortgage market
but it also meant that the underlying asset quality could vary from one vintage to another.
Each index tracks twenty equally weighted, static U.S. portfolios of credit default swaps (CDS)
backed by subprime mortgages, issued in the six-month period prior to the index launch date. Each
index adopts a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) structure with five distinct tranches, covering
specifically rated reference obligations. The asset/tranche ratings (AAA, AA, A, BBB, and BBB-) are
assigned in accordance with those issued by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P’s) with the lower
rating chosen when the two agencies differ in their assessment of credit quality. In order to be included
in the index each residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) must meet stringent requirements,
such as deal size must be at least $500 million, the weighted average Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO)
score of the creditors backing the securities issued in the RMBS transaction may not be greater than
660 and at least four of the required tranches must be registered pursuant to the U.S. Securities Act of
1933.5 Each index is a synthetic CDO in which the ratings do not differentiate borrowers according to
their risk profiles. Instead they simply distinguish the order in which investors bear losses and receive
payments. The misconception that a AAA-rated ABX asset was equal to that of a AAA-rated corporate
bond led many mandate-driven bodies, such as pension funds and universities, to invest heavily in
these securities.
Fig. 1 plots ABX raw prices for each index from its issuance date until December 31, 2011.6
There is clearly a steep decline in prices in all four indexes over the sample period. As the subprime
deals underlying the ABX 06-1 index were issued in the second half of 2005 the assets underlying this
index would be of considerably better quality than those included in later issued indexes.7 It is clear
that all assets in this index traded at or near par for all of 2006 before declining rapidly during 2007, a
trend replicated in the other three indexes. However, the AAA-rated asset in the ABX 06-1 index does
not reach the lows of later issued assets of equivalent credit rating, highlighting that the later issued
indexes were of deteriorating quality (with an associated increase in risk) and consequently were
hardest hit during the crisis. However, the AAA-rated assets of all indexes are clearly differentiated
from the other tranches of any given vintage. The tranches rated below AAA all suffer huge losses and
are hardly distinguishable by the sample end.
Given that our main focus is on measuring contagion emanating from this market, an important
choice must be made between the subprime mortgage-backed assets. We  choose to work with the
returns (measured as the difference in the logarithm of each index) on AAA-rated assets as the relative
size of this tranche swamped the other tranches in many of the underlying structured products. Also,
as we can see from Fig. 1, the AAA-tranche was  the most liquid tranche in each index and therefore
provides a truer reflection of market conditions for this sector. We  use two  alternative series. Firstly, we
include the longest available AAA-rated variable, namely that from the January 2006 index. Secondly
we replicate the spliced index of Longstaff (2010), who constructs an on-the-run ABX index, by splicing
the series together at each issuance date, i.e., July 19, 2006, January 19, 2007 and July 19, 2007. While
it could be argued that the spliced series better reflects the prevailing conditions in the market, there
are also some potential pitfalls associated with this approach. Dungey et al. (2013) argue that, given
4 Stanton and Wallace (2011) provide an excellent overview of the ABX indexes and raise concerns about what drives the
prices of these indexes. However they remain the only publicly available data on subprime mortgage-backed assets and have
been  used to analyse the market by Fender and Scheicher (2008), Longstaff (2010), Dungey et al. (2013), among others.
5 In the U.S. an individual’s credit risk is commonly measured by a FICO score. These scores range from 300 to 850 and are
based on analysis of the individual’s credit history. A mortgage issued to a borrower with a FICO score of 620 or less is classified
as  a subprime mortgage.
6 Note that as each index was  issued six months subsequent to the previous vintage the data are unbalanced.
7 Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) document a gradual, but persistent, decline in the quality of subprime loans from 2001
to  2007.
T.J.
 Flavin,
 L.
 Sheenan
 /
 N
orth
 A
m
erican
 Journal
 of
 Econom
ics
 and
 Finance
 34
 (2015)
 167–186
 
171
0 20 40 60 80
100
120
01/06
05/06
09/06
01/07
05/07
09/07
01/08
05/08
09/08
01/09
05/09
09/09
01/10
05/10
09/10
01/11
05/11
09/11
06
-1 A
BX
 Index
A
A
A
 
A
A
 
A
B
B
 
B
 
B
B
B
neg
0 20 40 60 80
100
120
01/06
05/06
09/06
01/07
05/07
09/07
01/08
05/08
09/08
01/09
05/09
09/09
01/10
05/10
09/10
01/11
05/11
09/11
06
-2 A
BX
 Index
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
neg
0 20 40 60 80
100
120
01/06
05/06
09/06
01/07
05/07
09/07
01/08
05/08
09/08
01/09
05/09
09/09
01/10
05/10
09/10
01/11
05/11
09/11
07
-1 A
BX
 Index
A
A
A
 
A
A
 
A
B
B
 
B
 
B
B
B
neg
0 20 40 60 80
100
120
01/06
05/06
09/06
01/07
05/07
09/07
01/08
05/08
09/08
01/09
05/09
09/09
01/10
05/10
09/10
01/11
05/11
09/11
07
-2 A
BX
 Index
A
A
A
 
A
A
 
A
B
B
 
B
 
B
B
B
neg
Fig.
 1.
 A
B
X
.H
E
 in
d
exes
 valu
es
 by
 vin
tage
 of
 issu
e.
172 T.J. Flavin, L. Sheenan / North American Journal of Economics and Finance 34 (2015) 167–186
the differences in the underlying assets and their risk profiles, the various indexes are not suitable for
splicing and should be treated as separate assets. Furthermore, as our definition of correlation-based
contagion is “a statistically significant change in asset relationships between crisis and non-crisis
periods”, the changing composition of the spliced index could potentially obscure asset linkages over
time and bias our conclusions. Using both series allows us to assess if differences between the traded
and the spliced series are important in generating our results. The ABX data have been obtained from
the Markit Group Ltd. and daily returns are used in the analysis. The sample period ranges from January
19, 2006, to December 31, 2011.
2.2. Financial market variables
To cover the various sectors of the U.S. financial system, and to compare our findings to those
of Longstaff (2010), our empirical application includes variables from equity, corporate debt, U.S.
Treasury, liquidity and volatility markets, as well as the subprime mortgage-backed market. Since we
employ a range of model specifications and robustness checks, the following variables are all utilised
at various points in the analysis. The U.S. equity market is represented by the returns on the S&P 500
index and/or a sub-index of financial stocks. Conditions in the corporate debt market are measured
by the changes in spreads of the rates on Aaa- and Baa-rated debt over the 10-year Treasury rate. Our
Treasury market proxies attempt to capture both long- and short-term interest rate changes so we
use the change in both the one- and 10-year Treasury rates. Financial market liquidity is captured by
two variables, namely the change in the Libor-OIS spread and the change in the rate charged on 30-
day asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). The former reflects conditions in the interbank market
while the latter represents the market for short-term funding. The VIX index of implied volatility,
computed from options on the S&P 500, serves as our volatility market variable. The change in the
VIX index reflects the changing expectations of future market uncertainty and is our chosen volatility
proxy. Treasury and corporate yield data and the Libor-OIS spread have been obtained from the Federal
Reserve Board while S&P, the ABCP and VIX data have been obtained from the Bloomberg system. As
with the ABX indexes the financial market variables data range from January 19, 2006, to December
31, 2011.
Given the relatively short data sample available to us, we choose to work with daily data, rather than
the weekly sampling employed by Longstaff (2010). The fast and furious nature of the changes during
the crisis period is probably better captured by higher frequency data. Furthermore, the econometric
methodology employed in this study (outlined below) is better able to distinguish between regimes
with more available data points.
2.3. Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for daily returns of the ABX indexes and changes to the financial
variables under analysis over the sample period.
Over the whole sample, the mean returns on each of the ABX assets are negative and decreasing in
credit quality. Consistent with Fig. 1, losses on the lower-rated tranches are much more pronounced
than those for their higher-rated counterparts. All tranches with a credit rating lower than AAA suffer
returns that are at least three times more negative than the most senior, AAA-rated, asset. In general,
the volatility of the asset returns are inversely related to the credit rating of the asset, though the BBB-
asset of the ABX 06-1 index violates this trend. Volatility increases more than 100% for the traded 06-1
and 37% for the spliced index as the ratings decline from AAA to BBB-. Comparing the traded index to
the spliced index, the returns are always more negative and usually more volatile on the spliced index.
This is due to the fact that the spliced index is composed of different asset vintages and is based on
the ABX 07-2 index for almost three quarters of the sample. This index, whose underlying deals were
struck when property prices were already in decline and subprime mortgages were quickly falling into
negative equity, suffered the sharpest decline of all the subprime mortgage-backed assets and greatly
influences the behaviour of the spliced index. All returns are negatively skewed, consistent with the
realisation of more adverse shocks than incidences of good news. Finally, all assets display significant
leptokurtosis, indicating the presence of fat tails in their distributions. This may  signal that the asset
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Table 1
Summary statistics.
Data set Rating Obs. Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis
ABX 06-1 index AAA 1552 −0.006 0.798 −1.065 23.731
AA 1552 −0.046 1.860 −0.201 16.755
A  1552 −0.130 1.931 −0.776 13.792
BBB 1552 −0.182 1.958 −2.732 24.219
BBB- 1552 −0.176 1.788 −2.272 20.626
Spliced ABX index AAA 1552 −0.057 1.607 −0.086 12.839
AA 1552 −0.187 1.942 −2.393 27.827
A  1552 −0.199 1.842 −1.230 9.748
BBB 1552 −0.227 2.217 −1.122 8.126
BBB- 1552 −0.224 2.211 −1.067 6.299
Financial market variables S&P 500 1552 0.0051 1.484 −0.468 6.518
S&P financials 1552 −0.0398 2.745 −0.081 8.636
One-year T-bill 1552 −0.0027 0.048 −0.154 25.368
10-year T-bond 1552 −0.0018 0.0679 −0.214 3.061
Aaa spread 1552 0.0005 0.089 −0.093 4.445
Baa spread 1552 0.00096 0.037 2.079 18.206
VIX 1552 0.0002 2.146 0.653 13.138
ABCP 1552 −0.0028 0.143 1.544 73.185
Libor-OIS 1552 0.00001 0.038 0.220 35.158
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the daily percentage changes for the indicated ABX indexes and financial market
variables over the entire sample period. The sample consists of daily data from January 20, 2006 to December 31, 2011. Obs.
denotes number of observations; Std. dev. denotes standard deviation.
returns are better modelled as a mixture of distributions or by a regime-switching framework. The
financial variables also highlight some interesting features of the markets during this period. Firstly,
the financial sector of the equity market generates negative mean returns, while the return on the
market as a whole is slightly positive. Furthermore, financial stock returns exhibit far more volatility
than the market index. The mean returns on both Treasury instruments are mildly negative over
the sample, reflecting the series of interest rate cuts introduced to encourage investment during the
recessionary period. Changes in corporate spreads average out at close to zero, though there is higher
volatility associated with the Aaa-rated sector, possibly due to the fact that these remained relatively
more liquid during the crisis. Likewise changes to the VIX, the ABCP rate, and the Libor-OIS spread are
negligible, on average, over the sample. Again all assets display evidence of being subjected to large
shocks of either sign (kurtosis) and significant asymmetries (skewness) over the time period.
3. The econometric methodology
Longstaff (2010) estimates a VAR model for each phase of the crisis and compares the relationships
between variables across these different time periods. The main advantage of the VAR framework is
that it is flexible enough to allow a relatively large number of assets to be considered simultaneously.
However, it also has a number of limitations. Firstly the crisis dates must be imposed exogenously.
This is often a contentious issue in assigning both the start and end dates, e.g., in recent studies of
the subprime crisis, Longstaff (2010) uses the calendar year of 2007 as the crisis period, while many
others use a later start date of July or August of that year (see Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo,
Martin, & Tang, 2009; Hatemi-J & Roca, 2011; among others). Secondly, this type of approach treats
all days within the defined crisis period equally, even though there will most likely be many days
without significant news for the financial markets. Thirdly, a model that is capable of modelling the
heteroskedasticity generated by regime shifts is likely to be more efficient and provide a better char-
acterisation of financial crises than a standard VAR approach. Hamilton (1989, 1990) popularised the
use of Markov-switching models in economic studies. Their application within the contagion litera-
ture has also become more common (Flavin & Panopoulou, 2010; Gravelle, Kichian, & Morley, 2006;
Jeanne & Masson, 2000; among others).
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We  wish to retain the flexibility of the VAR model while overcoming the limitations outlined above.
Thus, the Markov-switching VAR (MS-VAR) appears to be ideally suited to our needs. It allows the crisis
dates to be selected endogenously, accounts for no-news days within the turbulent period and models
the heteroskedasticity of financial assets within the regime-switching structure.
We employ a two-state MS-VAR, with our two  discrete states denoted as s1 and s2. s1 represents a
low-volatility, “non-crisis” regime while s2 represents a high-volatility, “crisis” regime. A two-regime
model is chosen due to the relatively short length of our data and it provides a tractable framework
within which to apply our definition of correlation-based contagion, i.e., a significant increase in cross-
market linkages following a shock in one market, and to test for its presence. Our model takes the
following form:
yi,t = ˛(st) +
K∑
k=1
ˇk(st)yi,t−k + sti,t, st ∈
{
1, 2
}
, sti,t∼i.i.d.N(0,  2s ), (1)
in which yi,t is an n dimensional time series vector of dependent variables,  ˛ is a matrix of state
dependent intercepts, ˇ1, . . .,  ˇk are matrices of the state dependent autoregressive coefficients and
capture the relationships between our financial variables, and st
i,t
is a state dependent noise vector,
which has a zero mean and constant variance within each regime. st is an unobserved random variable
that signals the switch from regime to another. Since the true regime cannot be observed, we  must
specify the paths by which the regimes transit from one to another. We  assume st follows a first-order
Markov process in which the current regime, st relies only on the regime one period in the past, st−1.
Early Markov-switching regime models imposed a fixed transition probability (FTP) on the move-
ment between states, a restriction which was relaxed by Filardo (1994). He proposed a methodology
which allows the transition probabilities to vary over time and be modelled as functions of chosen
information variables, i.e., a variable that triggers the switch in regime. This time-varying transition
probability (TVTP) specification nests the FTP model and allows us to test if the conditioning variables
have explanatory power over the regime switches. In our application, this provides a natural way  to
test for the type of contagion proposed by Masson (1999a, 1999b). However, the information variable
must be selected carefully. Filardo (1998) details the conditions that this variable must satisfy. The
information variable must, in general, be uncorrelated with the contemporaneous regime and thus
consequently, most empirical applications of the TVTP model select lagged, pre-determined, variables
upon which to condition the regime path. Thus the regimes paths evolve according to a first order
Markov-chain and are directly affected by the information variable zt−l:
p[st = 1|st−1 = 1] = p11(zt−1),
p[st = 2|st−1 = 2] = p22(zt−1),
p[st = 2|st−1 = 1] = p12(zt−1),
p[st = 1|st−1 = 2] = p21(zt−1),
(2)
in which pij denotes the probability that the system is in state i at time t − 1 and in state j at time t.
In common with much of the applied literature, we model the transition probabilities as a logistical
functional form:
p11(zt−l) =
exp(0 +
∑L
l=1lzt−l)
1 + exp(0 +
∑L
l=1lzt−l)
,
p22(zt−l) =
exp(0 +
∑L
l=1lzt−l)
1 + exp(0 +
∑L
l=1lzt−l)
.
(3)
The FTP alternative is nested within the TVTP model. In particular, for L = 1, if the 1 and 1 param-
eters are jointly zero, then the TVTP model collapses to the FTP model. The model is estimated using
the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm, as described in Hamilton (1990).
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4. Estimated models and results
4.1. Model specification
As our model is highly nonlinear, we aim for a parsimonious representation of the U.S. financial sys-
tem. Our initial analysis is performed on a six variable system with each variable selected to represent
a particular sector of the financial system. The subprime asset-backed securities market is represented
by the highest-rated and longest-traded ABX tranche available, i.e., the AAA-rated tranche of the ABX
06-1 index. We  also employ, in a separately estimated model, the spliced index. We feel that the
continuously-traded asset is more suited to tests of contagion but using both allows us to assess if
the choice of traded or spliced data is important in explaining the results. The S&P 500 index and
the change in the Aaa-rated corporate spread over Treasuries are taken to represent the equity and
corporate debt markets respectively. Conditions in the market for U.S. Treasuries are captured by the
change in the one-year Treasury rate, while the general financial market environment is proxied by a
liquidity variable, the change in the Libor-OIS spread, and the change in the VIX index.
Given the large number of parameters to be estimated in our six variable system, we are mindful
of not including too many lags in the MS-VAR model. We  began our analysis with four lags (K = 4 in
Eq. (1)) but due to the non-significance of any of the fourth lags, we  reduced the dimensionality of the
system to K = 3. This procedure was repeated until finally settling on two  lags, K = 2.
Finally, we select the information variable that potentially influences the regime paths. As we are
primarily interested in the effect of the subprime-mortgage backed sector on the broader financial
system, we turn to our ABX assets to select this trigger variable. Ideally, we  would like an exogenous
variable. Since we include the AAA-rated asset as an endogenous variable in the MS-VAR, we  prefer
to select a variable from outside of the system. We  therefore turn to the returns on the AA-rated asset
of the ABX 06-1 index (or the spliced index, when appropriate). However, the AA-rated asset cannot
really be thought of as being truly uncorrelated with the state of the system so, in our application, we
use the first lag of this variable, i.e., we set L = 1 in Eq. (3). Thus, our TVTP MS-VAR analysis includes the
AAA-rated asset within the VAR model, with regime changes dependent upon the lagged behaviour
of the AA-rated asset.8
4.2. Discussion of results
Initially, we focus on the ability of the information variable to predict the regime switches in our
model. In particular, we test the hypothesis that the lagged return on the AA-rated asset contains no
information relevant to the determination of the regime which, if true, would imply that there is no
evidence of contagion from the subprime mortgage-backed market. We  perform a likelihood ratio (LR)
test in which our null hypothesis is that 1 = 1 = 0.
Though the signs of the coefficients on the information variable make intuitive sense with the
positive 1 and negative 1 implying that good (bad) news in the ABX market increases the probability
of being in the non-crisis (crisis) regime, these coefficients are not significantly different from zero.
Consequently, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 1 and 1 are jointly zero. This implies that the
lagged return on the ABX asset is not informative in predicting the regime switches over the period
and therefore provides no evidence that contagion from this market was an important factor leading
to the widespread financial market turmoil experienced.
Table 2 also presents the expected values and volatility of all assets. We  classify the regimes by
analysing the volatility of the variables in each state. There is no ambiguity as the volatility of all assets
increases substantially in state 2, allowing us to easily identify this as the crisis period. Table 2 also
shows that, as we move from the non-crisis to the crisis regime, the sign of the constant terms changes
for every asset. The non-crisis period is characterised by statistically significant positive changes to
the prices of the subprime mortgage-backed asset and equity, while the Libor-OIS spread is on average
8 Our results are not dependent on the choice of information variable. We check their robustness by selecting other tranches
of  the ABX index and it does not alter our conclusions.
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Table 2
Model estimates for transition probabilities, expected values and standard deviations: analysis using traded ABX 06-1 index.
Panel A: transition probabilities
0 2.338** * 1 0.136
0 1.288** * 1 −0.037
H0: 1 = 1 = 0 LR test stat. 2.87
Panel B: expected returns and standard deviations
Non-crisis regime Crisis regime
 ˛   ˛ 
ABX AAA-rated asset 0.0341 0.0872 −0.0696 1.6319
(3.30***) (31.21***) (−0.80) (15.97***)
S&P  500 index 0.0780 0.8385 −0.1995 5.0240
(2.37**) (25.39***) (−1.29) (11.36***)
Aaa  corporate spread −0.0025 0.0036 0.0106 0.0114
(−1.26) (27.31***) (1.51) (13.77***)
One-year T-bill 0.0005 0.0004 −0.0111 0.0062
(0.71) (27.70***) (−2.14**) (17.14***)
Libor-OIS spread −0.0005 0.0001 0.0027 0.0045
(−2.02**) (26.65***) (0.55) (18.67** *)
VIX  index −0.0722 1.5294 0.1706 10.8485
(−1.65*) (27.47** *) (0.71) (12.68** *)
Notes: Panel A reports the coefficients on the transition probabilities (Eq. (3)) and a likelihood ratio (LR) test on the null hypothesis
that  the information variable (lagged return on the AA-rated 06-1 asset) has no explanatory power over the regime path. Panel
B  reports the regime-specific constant terms and variances from Eq. (1). T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
decreasing. Though not statistically significant at conventional levels, this period is typified by negative
changes to the Aaa-rated corporate spread and the VIX index, while daily changes in the one-year
Treasury rate are approximately zero. In contrast, the only statistically significant coefficient in the
crisis period suggests a declining rate on the one-year Treasury bill as the Federal Reserve aggressively
cut interest rates. The other estimates suggest negative equity and ABX returns, increasing corporate
debt yields and short-term funding costs as well as greater uncertainty about the future financial
environment were all features of the turbulent period.
Table 3 presents the regime-specific correlations between each pair of assets. We  report these
simply to illustrate the changes in asset co-movements between regimes and they should not be
interpreted as evidence of contagion. The lower triangle of Table 3 contains those correlations which
pertain to the non-crisis period with the corresponding numbers for the crisis period reported on the
upper triangle. Focussing initially on the ABX asset, we see that in both regimes it has positive co-
movement with changes in the equity market and with the one-year Treasury rate but is negatively
related to changes in the Aaa corporate spread, the Libor-OIS spread and the VIX index. Interestingly
the magnitude of its correlation with each of the other assets intensifies during the crisis regime. This
Table 3
Regime-specific correlations: analysis using traded 06-1 index.
ABX S&P 500 Aaa spread One-year T-bill Libor-OIS VIX
ABX 1 0.383 −0.270 0.156 −0.023 −0.329
S&P  500 0.366 1 −0.315 0.320 −0.146 −0.830
Aaa  Spread −0.200 −0.378 1 −0.401 −0.031 0.241
One-year T-bill 0.060 0.071 −0.215 1 −0.135 −0.288
Libor-OIS −0.013 0.016 −0.050 −0.138 1 0.129
VIX  −0.312 −0.833 0.329 −0.061 −0.014 1
Notes: This table reports the asset correlations generated by our TVTP MS-VAR model. Correlations for the non-crisis period are
reported in the lower triangle of the table, while the crisis period correlations are presented in the upper triangle.
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Fig. 2. Smoothed probability of a crisis regime: analysis using traded ABX 06-1 index.
pattern is generally true for the other assets in the system but there are some exceptions. The increases
in the absolute value of the pairwise correlations are a feature of high-volatility crisis periods (Forbes
& Rigobon, 2002) and while it may  suggest a change in cross-market relationships, we require further
analysis before we can conclude if this constitutes contagion or not.
To undertake this analysis, we first plot the smoothed probabilities of the system being in a crisis
regime. We  calculate these probabilities as follows:
P(St = i|FT ; ), i = 1, 2, (4)
in which FT denotes the collection of all observed variables up to and including time T, i.e., all infor-
mation in the sample and  is the vector of parameters (˛(s), ˇk(s), 2s , p11, p22, p12, p21). Smoothed
estimates are then computed via the backward recursion algorithm as presented by Kim (1994) and
Hamilton (1994).
Fig. 2 shows the smoothed probability of the system being in a crisis regime and suggests that the
watershed of regimes occurred about July 2007. This starting point coincides with that employed by
Dungey et al. (2009) and Hatemi-J and Roca (2011) but contrasts with the earlier start date of Longstaff
(2010). It depicts how the early part of 2007 was predominantly a tranquil time in the financial markets
and therefore highlights the danger of employing this calendar year as the “subprime crisis” period,
since it is a mixture of two different states of the world. Therefore treating it as a single episode masks
potentially important changes occurring between regimes. The crisis persists for roughly two years
before the non-crisis period re-establishes itself as the more likely regime in early-2009. Another
interesting feature of Fig. 2 is that even within the crisis period, there are a number of days when
markets returned to a state of tranquillity, especially during the second quarter of 2008. This was
possibly due to little news or thin trading on those days, so it is important not to include such days
in our crisis sample since they may  dilute the true intensity of the shock transmission during the
turbulent episode.
Finally, we address the main issue; do the results of our analysis produce evidence of contagious
effects transmitting the crisis across financial markets or can interdependencies between these sectors
account for the widespread financial turmoil? The former is characterised by parameter instability
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Table 4
Tests for contagion: analysis using traded ABX 06-1 index.
Contagion from ABX S&P 500 Aaa spread One-year T-bill Libor-OIS VIX
To
ABX – 0.21 0.46 0.85 0.93 0.36
S&P  500 0.34 – 0.23 0.51 0.26 0.04**
Aaa spread 0.78 0.77 – 0.76 0.03** 0.69
One-year T-bill 0.85 0.77 0.95 – 0.96 0.45
Libor-OIS 0.89 0.68 0.91 0.22 – 0.42
VIX  0.52 0.22 0.22 0.92 0 . 10* –
Notes: This table reports the p-values of our Likelihood ratio (LR) tests for contagion between each pair of assets. Contagion is
defined as a statistically significant change in asset relationships between non-crisis and crisis periods, so our test is based on
the  null hypothesis of “No Contagion”, i.e., ˇij,k(s = 1) = ˇij,k(s = 2), where i and j represent the assets under consideration, k the
lag  and i /= j. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that asset relationships are stable across regimes. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
between regimes whereas the latter would yield stable relationships. Table 4 presents the p-values
from a likelihood ratio test where the null hypothesis is that the VAR coefficients do not change
as we move between regimes, i.e., ˇij,k(s = 1) = ˇij,k(s = 2), where i and j represent the assets under
consideration, k the lag and i /= j.
We first concentrate on the transmission channels from the AAA-rated subprime mortgage-backed
asset to the other sectors of the financial system. In contrast to Longstaff (2010), we find no statistical
evidence of a change in the relationship between the ABX asset and any of the other assets under con-
sideration during the crisis period. Hence we  conclude against the presence of contagion. Similarly,
there is no evidence of contagion from the other assets to the ABX asset. Thus, it appears to be interde-
pendence between markets that propagated the initial shock to the subprime mortgage-backed sector
across the U.S. financial system. The responses of other markets to this shock could have been antici-
pated if the degree of cross-market integration or interdependence had been properly recognised. In
a study of international stock markets, Brière, Chapelle, and Szafarz (2012) reach a similar conclusion
regarding the spread of crises. The international transmission of shocks is attributed to globalisation
rather than to contagion.
We  continue to analyse the remainder of the system and find limited evidence of contagion. In
fact, the only evidence produced that is consistent with different relationships between crisis and
non-crisis periods relates to the liquidity variable, Libor-OIS, and the VIX. Our results suggest that
there was contagion from the Libor-OIS spread to both the corporate debt market and the VIX index.
Furthermore the relationship between the VIX and the S&P also intensified during the crisis period.
All other relationships remain stable between regimes.
At first, the lack of evidence of contagion in the U.S. financial system may  appear confusing given
the widespread turmoil experienced. The majority of pairwise relationships remained stable during
this transition, implying that ultimately the negative returns, higher spreads, reduced liquidity and
increased uncertainty were due to the strong interdependence of the various sectors of the financial
system rather than to contagion. Given the relationships that existed between the ABX asset and the
other variables during “normal” market conditions, then if one had correctly anticipated the magnitude
of the downturn in the asset-backed market, one should also have expected the changes to the other
assets. The only evidence of excessive shock transmission stems from the liquidity variable to the
corporate debt and volatility markets and from the VIX to the equity market. In these instances, the
responses in the recipient markets to liquidity and volatility shocks were greater than could have
been anticipated based on non-crisis relationships. These excessive responses provide us with limited
evidence of contagion.
We undertake a number of robustness checks. Firstly, we change the composition of the six-variable
vector, yt. In particular, we replace the S&P 500 index with the S&P subindex of financial stocks. In
another application, we change our liquidity variable to the change in the ABCP rate. We  analyse many
different combinations – though not an exhaustive set of combinations – and our conclusions do not
change. There is no evidence of contagion from (or to) the subprime mortgage-backed market. We
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Fig. 3. Smoothed probability of a crisis regime: analysis using spliced ABX index.
continue to see evidence of contagion from the liquidity variable though the evidence from the ABCP
rate is less compelling than from the Libor-OIS spread.9 We also investigate the role of the spliced ABX
index and finally look at the evidence from more parsimonious models. These results are discussed in
the following sections.
4.3. Robustness checks with the spliced index
Given the disparity between our results and those of Longstaff (2010), we repeat our analysis using
the spliced series, instead of the traded asset, as our proxy for the subprime mortgage asset-backed
market. We  wish to investigate if using this series produces more evidence of contagion since the com-
position of the reference assets change on each splicing date and, consequently, differ between crisis
and non-crisis periods. As argued earlier, the quality of the assets underlying the index deteriorated
across vintage of issue so, a priori, we cannot rule out that the splicing together of these differ-
ent vintages may  artificially induce changes in the relationships among variables between different
regimes.
We re-estimate the model and our results are contained in Fig. 3 and Tables 5–7. Given the similarity
of results, we briefly sketch our main findings here, paying attention to areas of difference.
The most important difference is the role of the information variable in determining the regime
path. Unlike the traded asset, the return on the spliced AA-rated ABX asset exerts a statistically sig-
nificant influence on the transition probabilities. Again the coefficients signs are intuitively correct
and we reject the null hypothesis that 1 and 1 are jointly zero. In fact, only 1 is individually sig-
nificant, suggesting that the subprime mortgage-backed market influenced the switch to the crisis
but not the subsequent exit from the turmoil. The role of the ABX asset return in the determination
of the regime switch to the high-volatility, crisis state is consistent with the definition of contagion
proposed by Masson (1999a, 1999b). This finding may be attributed to the declining quality of the
9 To conserve space, we do not report these results but they are available from the authors.
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Table 5
Model estimates for transition probabilities, expected values and standard deviations: analysis using spliced ABX index.
Panel A: transition probabilities
0 2.624*** 1 0.266***
0 1.415*** 1 −0.049
H0: 1 = 1 = 0 LR test stat. 9.80***
Panel B: expected returns and standard deviations
Non-crisis regime Crisis regime
 ˛   ˛ 
ABX AAA-rated asset 0.0296 0.6776 −0.1990 6.5814
(1.05) (30.54***) (−1.21) (15.25***)
S&P  500 index 0.0923 0.8868 −0.2451 5.1512
(2.80***) (26.69***) (−1.45) (11.25***)
Aaa  corporate spread −0.0028 0.0038 0.0125 0.0113
(−1.34) (27.01***) (1.66*) (13.11***)
One-year T-bill 0.0003 0.0004 −0.0111 0.0067
(0.48) (27.61***) (−1.95*) (15.74***)
Libor-OIS spread −0.0006 0.0001 0.0035 0.0048
(−2.64***) (27.02***) (0.66) (17.81***)
VIX  Index −0.0826 1.5888 0.1862 11.3008
(−1.91*) (28.95***) (0.71) (12.02***)
Notes: Panel A reports the coefficients on the transition probabilities (Eq. (3)) and a likelihood ratio (LR) test on the null hypothesis
that  the information variable (the lagged return on the AA-rated spliced asset) has no explanatory power over the regime path.
Panel  B reports the regime-specific constant terms and variances from Eq. (1). T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *
denote  significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 6
Regime-specific correlations: analysis using spliced ABX index.
ABX S&P 500 Aaa spread One-year T-bill Libor-OIS VIX
ABX 1 0.443 −0.254 0.204 −0.018 −0.419
S&P  500 0.324 1 −0.328 0.325 −0.148 −0.828
Aaa  Spread −0.175 −0.356 1 −0.412 −0.029 0.244
One-year T-bill 0.080 0.063 −0.228 1 −0.136 −0.291
Libor-OIS −0.040 0.004 −0.046 −0.126 1 0.131
VIX  −0.253 −0.836 0.319 −0.056 −0.004 1
Notes: This table reports the asset correlations generated by our TVTP MS-VAR model, using the spliced AAA-rated ABX asset as
our  proxy for the subprime mortgage-backed market. Correlations for the non-crisis period are reported in the lower triangle
of  the table, while the crisis period correlations are presented in the upper triangle.
Table 7
Tests for contagion: analysis using spliced ABX index.
Contagion from ABX S&P 500 Aaa spread One-year T-bill Libor-OIS VIX
To
ABX – 0.20 0.60 0.57 0.69 0.19
S&P  500 0.57 – 0.13 0.55 0.23 0.01***
Aaa  spread 0.41 0.40 – 0.52 0.05** 0.51
One-year T-bill 0.62 0.71 0.98 – 0.66 0.48
Libor-OIS 0.44 0.60 0.90 0.30 – 0.37
VIX  0.45 0.15 0.14 0.87 0.06* –
Notes: Here we use the spliced AAA-rated ABX asset to represent the subprime mortgage-backed market. This table reports
the  p-values of our Likelihood ratio (LR) tests for contagion between each pair of assets. Contagion is defined as a statistically
significant change in asset relationships between non-crisis and crisis periods, so our test is based on the null hypothesis of
“No  Contagion”, i.e., ˇij,k(s = 1) = ˇij,k(s = 2), where i and j represent the assets under consideration, k the lag and i /= j. Failure to
reject  the null hypothesis implies that asset relationships are stable across regimes. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and  10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8
Further tests of the role of the spliced index in explaining the regime path.
Panel A: Six-variable models with different samples
Full sample 0.25
Start date: July 2006 0.55
Start date: January 2007 0.02
Start date: July 2007 0.01
Panel B: Lower dimension models (full sample)
Stock market model 0.31
Corporate debt market model 0.36
Treasury market model 0.18
Liquidity market model 0.01
Volatility market model 0.01
Notes: Here we report the p-values of a likelihood ratio (LR) test on the null hypothesis that the information variable has no
explanatory power over the determination of the regime path. In all of these specifications, the information variable is the
AA-rated asset of the spliced index.
assets underlying the later issues of the ABX indexes. The deterioration in the quality of subprime
mortgages, declines in real estate prices and the increased uncertainty surrounding the associated
securitised financial products, impacted greatly on the 2007 issues of the ABX indexes and appear
to have acted as a catalyst for the crisis that swept through the financial system. We  investigate this
hypothesis in more detail below.
The remaining results for the spliced index are similar to before. The start of the crisis period is the
same – July 2007 – but its duration is slightly longer, by just a couple of months. It is worth bearing
in mind that the entire crisis period is represented by the AAA-rated tranche of the final vintage of
the ABX index and all deals underlying this issuance were struck in the first half of 2007. This issue
suffered steeper declines than the 2006 issue employed in the previous analysis, which may  explain
the slightly longer crisis duration between Figs. 2 and 3.
The change in sign for the expected returns and increased volatilities for all assets are again
observed as the financial markets transit from “normal” conditions to the high-volatility state (Table 5)
and the pattern in correlations is also unchanged (Table 6). More importantly, and despite our reser-
vations about using the spliced series, our conclusions regarding contagion remain unaltered. There is
still no evidence of contagion either to or from the subprime mortgage asset-backed market (Table 7).
Its role appears to be confined to triggering the crisis episode and then through its interdependence
with the other sectors of the U.S. financial system. The same pattern of contagion is also confirmed
with evidence of contagion from the liquidity variable to corporate debt and volatility markets and
from the VIX to the equity index.
We  undertake further analysis to investigate the hypothesis that factors captured by the spliced, but
not the ABX 06-1, index (such as declining lending standards and poorer loan quality) are important in
triggering the regime switch. We  estimate a model with the AAA-rated asset of the continuously traded
06-1 index included in the vector of dependent variables but specify the spliced variable as the infor-
mation variable governing the regime path. This allows us to shed light on whether or not the difference
in results reported above are really driven by the deteriorating conditions in the subprime-mortgage
market. Table 8 reports the results of the tests that the information variable has no explanatory power
over the determination of regime switches.
Panel A refers to the full six-variable model. Over the whole sample, we fail to find a statistically
significant relationship between the spliced information variable and the regime path. Just as in the
earlier model with the continuously traded asset, we conclude against the presence of contagion. To
gain a better understanding of how the later vintages affect the evolution of regimes, we undertake
further analysis by restricting the sample to exclude the earlier issues. For example, we  start the
sample at July 20, 2006 so that the first vintage will be excluded from the spliced variable and repeat the
exercise until only the final vintage (07-2) remains. This estimation strategy obviously omits important
information from the sample and thus results should be treated with caution. But, it does allow us to
assess the importance of later vintages and provides an indication of what may  be driving our results.
When 2006-issued indices are included in the sample, the information variable does not explain the
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regime switches. However, when the sample begins in 2007, the later vintages exert a statistically
significant influence on the regime path. This provides some evidence that the later vintages of the
spliced index help to determine the state of the system.
On balance, we conclude that there is very limited evidence of contagion in our findings. There
is no evidence, whatsoever, that the cross-market relationships involving the subprime mortgage-
backed market were unstable between regimes. Thus, it would appear that market interdependence,
and not contagion, was the main transmission mechanism of the crisis. There is some evidence that
the subprime market was a trigger variable for the transition of the financial system to a new bad
equilibrium. However, over the full sample, this is limited to the model using spliced indices in the
vector of dependent variables and as the information variable. This finding does not hold when the
continuously traded asset is used to represent the subprime backed market. Restricting the sample
suggests that later vintages are more successful in predicting the regime path but their is influence is
diluted in the full time period.
4.4. Systems of smaller dimension
Given our results pertaining to the stability of cross-market relationships, a remaining doubt is that
our failure to reject the hypothesis of “no contagion” may  be due to the large number of parameters
that need to be estimated simultaneously. A highly nonlinear model such as the TVTP MS-VAR can be
quite sensitive to the inclusion of many variables and lags (Manzan, 2004). The lack of precision of
these estimates may  result in our model having low power to reject the null hypothesis. We  address
this potential problem by estimating a range of smaller systems. Of course, we acknowledge that in
so doing we may  expose ourselves to an omitted variables problem but given the sparse evidence
of any cross-market predictability in the six variable model, we proceed to analyse the models of
smaller dimension. In particular, we estimate models based on assets from a particular sector of the
financial system and, since we are ultimately concerned with measuring contagion from the subprime
mortgage asset-backed market, we include the return on the AAA-rated tranche of the January 2006
issue of the ABX index in all specifications. The Libor-OIS spread is also included since the original
model identifies this as the main source of contagion. The information variable employed is the return
on the traded AA-rated tranche of the 06-1 index.10 We  deal with each of these sectors in turn and
only report the results of our tests for contagion.11 Table 9 presents our results.
4.4.1. Equity markets
We  begin with equity markets and estimate a four variable MS-VAR model with two  lags, in which
the variables analysed are the return on the S&P 500 index, the return on S&P financial index, changes
in the Libor-OIS spread and the return on the AAA-rated ABX 06-1 asset. Results are reported in panel A
of Table 9. As in the larger model, we find no evidence of either form of contagion. The lagged AA-asset
return is unable to predict the regime switch and all relationships involving the subprime mortgage
asset-backed market appear stable between regimes. The only evidence of contagion again stems from
the Libor-OIS variable and is transmitted to the index of financial stocks, with the liquidity shortage
exerting a larger than anticipated negative influence on the financial sector.
4.4.2. Corporate debt markets
Again we use a four variable specification. For corporate debt markets, we  use the change in the
spread over 10-year Treasuries on both the Aaa- and Baa-rated bonds. Results are contained in panel
B of Table 9. Once more, the subprime mortgage-backed asset plays no role in determining the regime
path. We  detect a statistically significant change in the relationship between the subprime mortgage
asset and the Aaa-rated corporate spread. However, upon closer inspection, we find that it is due to a
weakening of the relationship between the two assets in the crisis period. The sum of the coefficients
10 For completeness, we re-estimate all models using the spliced AA-rated asset as the information variable. Results are
presented Table 8 (Panel B). Since the pattern does not change, we restrict our discussion to the results presented in Table 9.
11 All results are available on request.
T.J. Flavin, L. Sheenan / North American Journal of Economics and Finance 34 (2015) 167–186 183
Table 9
Tests for contagion by financial sector: analysis using traded ABX 06-1 index.
Panel A: equity market
H0: 1 = 1 = 0 LR test stat. 2.44
Contagion from: ABX S&P 500 S&P Financials Libor-OIS
To:
ABX – 0.89 0.40 0.69
S&P  500 0.69 – 0.63 0.12
S&P  financials 0.73 0.20 – 0.03**
Libor-OIS 0.89 0.72 0.74 –
Panel  B: Corporate Debt Market
H0: 1 = 1 = 0 LR Test Stat 3.63
Contagion from: ABX Aaa spread Baa spread Libor-OIS
To:
ABX  – 0.69 0.59 0.70
Aaa  spread 0.02** – 0.01*** 0.07*
Baa  spread 0.75 0.13 – 0.03**
Libor-OIS 0.92 0.67 0.53 –
Panel  C: U.S. Treasury market
H0: 1 = 1 = 0 LR Test Stat 5.41*
Contagion from: ABX One-year Treasury 10-year Treasury Libor-OIS
To:
ABX  – 0.89 0.33 0.70
One-year Treasury 0.92 – 0.92 0.03**
10-year Treasury 0.15 0.98 – 0.05**
Libor-OIS 0.76 0.01*** 0.10* –
Panel  D: short-term funding markets
H0: 1 = 1 = 0 LR Test Stat 27.81***
Contagion from: ABX Libor-OIS ABCP
To:
ABX – 0.68 0.38
Libor-OIS 0.90 – 0.02**
ABCP 0.59 0.000*** –
Panel E: volatility market
H0: 1 = 1 = 0 LR test stat. 24.15***
Contagion from: ABX VIX Libor-OIS
To:
ABX – 0.30 0.63
VIX 0.08* – 0.04**
Libor-OIS 0.78 0.41 –
For each sector of the financial system, we  estimate a separate model as specified in Eqs. (1)–(3). This table presents the main
results in Panels A–E. In each panel we initially report the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic of our test to choose between the
FTP  model (1 = 1 = 0) and TVTP model. The remainder of each panel presents p-values for tests of contagion between each pair
of  markets. The null hypothesis is “No Contagion” and implies ˇij,k(s = 1) = ˇij,k(s = 2), where i and j represent the assets under
consideration, k the lag and i /= j. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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changes from 0.0325 to 0.0075 and, in fact, the coefficient on the second lag is negative for the high-
volatility regime. Thus the changing relationship is more consistent with a “flight-to-quality” type
effect rather than contagion. It makes sense that investors, keen to flee the asset-backed market,
would turn to highly rated corporate debt in a bid to protect their portfolio investments.
Interestingly, we detect uni-directional contagion between the bond classes. Shocks to the Baa-
rated bond result in greater than anticipated responses in its Aaa-rated counterpart. This may  be
due to decreasing confidence in the ratings or just heightened sensitivity in the latter. There is also
evidence of contagion from the liquidity variable to both corporate debt instruments, though the
change in the relationship is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.07) in the case of Aaa-rated bond.
In both cases the spread increases during the crisis as pressure on short-term funds adversely affected
the corporate debt market more than could have been expected during “normal” financial market
conditions.
4.4.3. U.S. Treasury market
In analysing the relationship between the subprime mortgage-backed market, the Libor-OIS, and
the market for U.S. Treasuries, we capture both the short- and long-end of the U.S. Treasury yield
curve by including both the daily change in the rate on one-year and 10-year Treasuries. Panel C
of Table 9 displays our results. Interestingly the information variable becomes marginally signifi-
cant here. In the smaller system without equity or corporate debt variables, the lagged ABX variable
helps to predict the evolution of the regime path. This is a feature of the reduced-dimension mod-
els that exclude corporate funding markets. Once more, cross-market relationships involving the
subprime-backed asset appear stable between regimes and hence we find no support for the cor-
relation channel of contagion. This is in contrast to the liquidity variable whose relationship with both
of the Treasury instruments changes between regimes. The pattern of change is interesting with the
relationship between Libor-OIS and the shorter-term instrument becoming significantly more nega-
tive. This implies that liquidity shortages led to greater than expected cuts in the one-year Treasury
rates as the Federal Reserve aggressively cut rates in an effort to combat the developing crisis. On the
other hand, the Libor-OIS and 10-year Treasury relationship becomes less negative, suggesting that
liquidity shortages did not impact on the longer-maturity bonds as much as expected. The falls in the
long rates were less than predicted by “normal” market relationships and may  have been offset by
the increasing economic risk. This shows an important distinction between the sensitivity of short-
and long-term Treasuries to liquidity shocks. Of further interest is that the relationship changes are
bi-directional. Again, there are subtle differences in the way Libor-OIS responds to shocks in Treasuries
of different maturities. The response of the liquidity variable to a cut in the one-year rate becomes
significantly more negative, suggesting that surprise cuts at the short end of the Treasury curve did
not have the desired effect of restoring liquidity to the banking sector. In contrast, changes in the
10-year Treasury rate have no effect on Libor-OIS during the high-volatility regime, again reinforcing
the idea that changes to long rates are ineffective during a liquidity shortfall. The failure of Treasury
rate cuts to reverse liquidity is probably due to the uncertainty that often surrounded government
policy during the turbulent period and the ensuing hoarding of liquid assets that took place by many
financial institutions.
4.4.4. Short-term liquidity markets
A trivariate MS-VAR is employed to assess the stability of linkages between the subprime mortgage
asset-backed market, the Libor-OIS spread and the market for 30-day ABCP. The latter two variables
are selected for their ability to capture liquidity conditions in the financial markets. We  document our
results in Panel D of Table 9. Interestingly, there is no evidence of changing relationships involving the
ABX asset but there is strong bi-directional evidence of contagion between the two  liquidity markets.
Adverse liquidity shocks produce positive and higher than anticipated changes to the rates on 30-day
ABCP, while adverse shocks to the ABCP market lead to greater impairment of the interbank market
than predicted by “normal” market relationships. The reinforcing effects of these two markets are
consistent with the severe liquidity shortages experienced in the market, especially after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
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4.4.5. Volatility market
Finally, we estimate a trivariate model of ABX returns, Libor-OIS, and the change in the VIX index.
Panel E of Table 9 presents our findings. Here we  find the only evidence of contagious effects from
the subprime mortgage-backed asset, although it is only marginally significant with a p-value of 0.08.
Therefore the only direct evidence of correlation contagion from this sector appears to be a relatively
weak transmission of excess future economic uncertainty as implied by option prices. Again we find
evidence of contagion from the liquidity market to the VIX. All other relationships are stable between
regimes.
The pattern that emerges from this analysis is that the subprime mortgage-backed market played
little role in causing the financial crisis. Once corporate equity or debt is incorporated into the system,
the effect of the ABX variable is subsumed and plays no role in driving the system to the high-volatility
regime. Likewise for the correlation channel, there is little evidence that it transmitted contagious
effects to other markets, with possibly the exception of the volatility market. Its relationships with
other sectors of the U.S. financial system remained stable between regimes and therefore we con-
clude that it was interdependence between markets that propagated the initial shock across the
system. Interestingly, the liquidity variable generates most evidence of contagion. Its relationships
often change as markets transit from a “normal” to a high-volatility regime. Thus, the excessive or
unpredictable reaction of the other sectors during the crisis period appears to be predominantly driven
by shocks to liquidity markets rather than the market for subprime mortgage-backed securities.
5. Conclusions
We  analyse the role of the subprime mortgage-backed market in causing the widespread turmoil
experienced in the U.S. financial system from 2007 to 2009. We  employ a TVTP MS-VAR methodology
which allows us to assess pairwise relationships across various sectors of the financial system. We
analyse two forms of contagion; firstly, contagion that gives rise to statistically significant changes
in cross-market relationships between the crisis and the non-crisis regimes and secondly contagion
that results from a particular variable driving the system to a new (bad) equilibrium. A number of
striking findings emerge from the study. Firstly, we find little or no evidence of contagion through
the correlation channel emanating from the subprime mortgage-backed market. Over a variety of
model specifications and robustness checks, we  consistently fail to find evidence of a statistically
significant change in the relationships between this market and other sectors of the financial system.
Initially, this may  seem surprising. However, the crashes in other markets appear to be a consequence
of the high degree of interdependence in the financial system rather than any excessive reaction to
the shock in the subprime asset-backed sector. Secondly, where any contagion is detected it tends
to originate from our liquidity variables, the Libor-OIS spread and/or the change in the 30-day ABCP
rate. Previously, liquidity problems in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers have been
attributed to transmitting the crisis internationally (Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak, & Tamirisa,
2009; Brunnermeier, 2008; among others) but here we  show that shocks to liquidity variables were
also instrumental in exacerbating the crisis across the U.S. financial system. Thirdly, there is limited
evidence that deteriorating conditions in the subprime mortgage-backed market helped to predict
the transition between regimes. However this result is not consistent across model specifications and,
over the full sample, only applies to models that employ the spliced index and not the actual traded
asset.
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